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Testing for a substantial lessening of competition is a concept that has been 
widely accepted and applied in the supervision of mergers, for example, in the 
United States, European Union, Japan, and Singapore, as well as in Thailand. 
However, this study reveals that the process to assess which mergers may result 
in a substantial lessening of competition is significantly different in Thailand in 
comparison to the other countries mentioned earlier. The detailed and complex 
process in foreign countries, results in the supervision of mergers based on the 
concept of substantially lessening competition being correct and efficient. This 
is different from the legal procedure of competition law in Thailand which is 
simple and explicit, but may lead to a distorted outcome, making the 
supervision of mergers according to Thailand competition law inefficient. 
Therefore, consideration should be given to improving the supervision of 
mergers, based on the concept of substantially lessening competition under the 
Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 (2017), in order to apply procedures 
correctly, meet objectives, and follow best practices, as demonstrated in the 
competition law of the United States, European Union, Japan, and Singapore. 
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For countries with liberalism or a 
capitalist economy, which use a 
market mechanism as a tool to 
effectively allocate resources in the 
economic system, it is necessary to 
have a significant law that empowers 
the state to intervene in the conduct of 
business operators and to protect the 
activation of market mechanisms, 
namely, competition law (Whish, 
2018). Such law aims to control three 
significant types of behavior in 
conducting business that may harm 
competition in the economic system, 
i.e. agreements to restrict competition, 
abuses of a dominant position 
(monopolization), and mergers. The 
competition law in each country may 
be defined as the prescribed rules and 
factors used to consider the 
differences in business operators' 
behavior (Hovenkamp, 2017). 
It is essential for the government 
to introduce a competition law to 
supervise mergers as they can easilly 
make an impact on the market by 
reducing or eliminating competition 
(Supanit, 2012). Besides this, they 
may affect the market structure; in 
other words, mergers may increase the 
level of market concentration, leading 
to the increasing market power of 
business operators. Compared to the 
agreement to restrict competition, 
mergers can cause a more permanent 
change in the market structure, 
making it possible for mergers to 
negatively affect the economy and 
damage operators, consumers, or 
competitors in the market rather than 
the anti-competitive agreement 
(Jones, 2019). Therefore, in order to 
achieve the objectives of competition 
law in protecting competition and the 
functioning of market mechanisms, 
merger control provisions are 
essential. 
The supervision of merger 
structure under competition law 
begins with the determination of a 
supervision system encompassing a 
pre-merger notification system or 
other systems, followed by the 
requirements or factors used to 
consider mergers, and the processes 
for implemention, including the 
power to enforce the law on mergers. 
All these issues are essential in 
generating a law which is able to 
supervise mergers efficiently (Lim & 
Clements, 2016). However, the major 
issue is the great complexity which 
effects the supervision of mergers 
through the determination of the 
criteria used to consider which 
mergers may result in a substantial 
lessening of competition, and which 
can in turn lead to determination of a 
final decision of whether a merger 
should take place or not. If such 
criteria are negligent or relaxed, 
merger supervision will not work as it 
should. On the other hand, if factors 
and criteria are set up too strictly, they 
will obstruct mergers and may 
consequently have a negative affect 
on economic development 
(Hovenkamp, 2005).  
One concept of consideration 
criteria for mergers which is widely 
accepted and adopted in supervising 
mergers under competition law in 
many countries, is the concept of 
mergers that are likely to lessen 
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competition substantially. Under this 
concept it is important to assess 
whether mergers may result in a 
substantial lessening of competition in 
a particular market by considering 
various factors (Buccirossi, 2008). 
This concept has gained acceptance as 
it can improve the efficiency of 
merger supervision by regulatory 
authorities which are able to 
comprehensively supervise mergers 
that may result in negative impacts on 
economic competition 
(Riesenkampff, 2004). In this regard, 
Thailand's competition law has also 
adopted such a concept for merger 
supervision. 
Nonetheless, regarding the 
adaptation of this concept within the 
supervision of mergers in Thailand, 
there are two main points for 
consideration: 1) which factors should 
be used to assess the potential impacts 
from mergers; and 2) how to set the 
consideration criteria for each factor, 
since the determination of the factors 
and criteria for the consideration is 
crucial for enabling the law to be 
enforced (Trebilcock et al., 2003). 
Such issues are found in Thailand's 
competition law as the determination 
of factors and criteria in applying such 
a concept in Thailand results in the 
regulatory authorities being unable to 
efficiently supervise mergers that may 
negatively impact competition. 
Therefore, this research aims to study 
the experiences of various countries in 
determining the factors and criteria 
for applying the concept of testing 
mergers for their potential to cause a 
substantial lessening of competition, 
ultimately obtaining a guideline for 
improving the supervision of mergers 
under Thai competition law 
accordingly. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
Generally, mergers bring about 
both positive and negative impacts on 
the economic system, as mergers may 
increase economic efficiency by 
producing economies of scale or 
allowing small business operators to 
better compete with large business 
operators (Gore, 2013). Meanwhile, 
mergers can decrease competition, 
especially horizontal mergers, which 
result in a decrease in the number of 
competitors in the market. Therefore, 
production becomes concentrated 
among a few manufacturers (Fulcher, 
2020), leading to increases in the 
market power of those business 
operators. In addition, mergers can 
reduce the production process and 
operating costs, especially vertical 
mergers. Mergers can also enable the 
merging companies to benefit from 
economies of scale and use of more 
efficient production technology. As a 
result, the business operators can 
reduce their production costs, leaving 
other operators at a disadvantage 
regarding competition and creating 
barriers to entry for new operators 
(Khantawit, 1997). Therefore, the 
government is required to enact 
regulatory provisions for mergers 
according to competition law in order 
to prevent the potentially severe 
consequences of mergers outlined 
above. 
The experience of supervising 
mergers in different countries has 
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shown that the most effective measure 
to supervise mergers should be a 
structural control measure. This 
measure empowers the regulatory 
authorities to prevent business 
operators from merging their 
businesses if it may enable them to 
engage in various forms of anti-
competitive behavior, which may 
have detrimental effects on consumers 
or competitors. However, provisions 
concerning the abuse of a dominant 
position or anti-competitive 
agreement limit the power of the 
regulatory authorities to only regulate 
the conduct of business operators after 
a merger. This causes many problems 
to the regulatory authorities in various 
countries, as the examination of anti-
competitive behaviors following a 
merger, particularly by restrictive 
agreement, is tremendously difficult 
and costly. This is consistent with law 
enforcement statistics, which show 
very low detection rates for such 
behavior in multiple countries (Lasok 
& Holmes, 2012). In addition, by 
allowing business operators to merge 
their businesses independently, 
supposing that a business operator 
raises the price of their products or 
services after the merger, there may be 
cases where the competition law 
cannot be used to regulate this 
behavior, especially if the merger did 
not result in a dominant position as 
required by the laws of each country 
(Hovenkamp, 2017). All of the above 
reasons were reflected in the strict and 
elaborate regulatory system for 
mergers under the competition laws of 
foreign countries, although such 
systems    will    be    burdensome   for 
business operators. 
The early supervision of mergers 
was based on the concept of a 
monopoly or market dominance. In 
other words, if the merger was likely 
to create a monopoly or strengthen its 
dominance over the market, the 
business operators would not be 
allowed to conduct a merger. 
However, the supervision of mergers 
using the concept of mergers that may 
result in a monopoly or market 
dominance makes the regulatory 
authorities unable to comprehensively 
supervise all mergers likely to harm 
competition (Werden, 2008). 
More specifically, mergers 
unlikely to result in a monopoly or 
market dominance are still likely to 
cause damage to competitors, trade 
partners, or consumers, particularly 
regarding their unilateral effects and 
interdependence effects (Hylton, 
2010). Firstly, the unilateral effects, 
which refer to a single business 
operator's ability to control prices or 
the quantities of products and services 
after a merger, primarily occur if the 
merged companies used to be 
competitors in the market before the 
merger. In this regard, the business 
operator does not need to encounter an 
opportunity to lose its revenue and 
profit from consumers who change to 
use the competitor's products or 
services after raising the prices of 
products or services (Elhauge, 2008). 
Secondly, the coordinated effects, 
which refer to a business operator’s 
ability to jointly raise prices, reduce 
production volume, or reduce the 
variety or quality of products and 
services, may lead to a lessening of 
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competition in the market. 
Cooperation among business 
operators can occur through explicit 
collusion, implicit collusion, or 
parallel pricing (Scott & Berry, 2010). 
From a practical perspective, 
these effects, which arise from 
mergers, cannot be employed 
interchangeably with other provisions 
or concepts to effectively supervise a 
merger (Kokkoris & Shelanski, 2014). 
Employing a cartel provision meets a 
legal standard requiring evidence to 
prove complicity among business 
operators. In a market where there is a 
small number of competitors, 
showing such evidence is quite tricky 
as a mutual agreement may occur in 
any form. Even regarding the 
application of the concept of 
collective dominance, the economic 
relationship must be proved, which 
seems to be very difficult (Geradin & 
Farrar & Petit, 2012). Therefore, to 
encourage regulatory authorities to 
supervise mergers which may impact 
competition, more comprehensively 
and efficiently, the concept of mergers 
that may lead to a substantial 
lessening of competition is accepted 
and applied in merger supervision. 
Under this concept, the regulatory 
authorities must only assess the 
impacts of mergers by considering the 
prescribed factors as described in the 
following article, without the restric-
tion that those mergers must result in 
a monopoly or dominant position; 
such a concept is flexible enough to 
encourage the regulatory authorities 
to better control the occurrence of 
mergers that may harm competition in 
the market (Heimler, 2008). 
The concept of mergers that are 
likely to substantially lessen 
competition occurred in 1914 in the 
United States of America, based on 
the experience of the enforcement of 
the United States antitrust law. In the 
beginning, this concept was not 
efficiently enforced due to confusion 
between antimonopoly legislation in 
the United States of America and a 
lack of appropriate principles 
regarding the relevant laws, as the 
regulatory authorities at that time 
determined the principles only by 
considering the competition among 
business operators who merged their 
businesses without considering the 
impacts on overall competition in the 
market (Bundeskartellamt, 2001). 
Only later, when the concept was 
continuously developed such that the 
economic principles were adopted as 
a guideline for determining the factors 
used to assess the impacts on overall 
competition in the market probably 
caused by mergers, the concept was 
applied to supervise mergers 
adequately (Posner, 2001). 
Adopting economic principles in 
assessing the impact of mergers is an 
essential point, allowing the concept 
of mergers resulting in a substantial 
lessening of competition, to be used in 
successful enforcement. Evidently, a 
large number of competition law 
regulatory authorities have accepted 
and adopted the concept regarding the 
potential impacts of mergers on 
competition and have developed 
guidelines for determining the factors 
used to assess the impacts caused by 
mergers as a model to supervise future 
mergers according to their 
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competition law in a comprehensive 
manner (Arai, 2019). The reason for 
this, is that the concept allows law 
enforcement to achieve a higher 
degree of tangibility, in turn allowing 
regulatory authorities to 
comprehensively supervise mergers 
which have potential to negatively 
impact competition in the market. 
This is different to the past legislation 
of most countries, which adopted the 
concept of monopoly and market 
dominance to supervise mergers, but 
was ultimately unable to be used 
effectively (Jones, 2019). 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
  
This study was conducted using a 
qualitative research technique as the 
method to study, analyze, and 
compare, the substantial lessening of 
competition test for mergers and 
acquisitions under competition law, 
including significant experience in 
supervising mergers under the law 
enforced in 2020 of the United States, 
European Union, Japan, Singapore 
and Thailand. The procedures of the 
study were as follows:  
1. Study documents comprised of 
provisions on the supervision of 
mergers under competition law, 
guidelines pursuant to competition 
law, books, articles, and research 
studies, including information related 
to experiences in the supervision of 
mergers following the concept of 
testing for a substantial lessening of 
competition from mergers under the 
competition law of the United States 
of America, European Union, Japan, 
Singapore, and Thailand. 
2. Analyze and compare the tests 
for substantial lessening of 
competition according to the 
competition law of different 
countries, acquiring a standard for 
testing the substantial lessening of 
competition from a merger, used in 
merger supervision. 
3. Interview experts associated 
with mergers according to 
competition law, i.e. committee 
members of the drafting of 
competition law and secondary 
legislation according to Thailand’s 
competition law, officials from the 
Office of Trade Competition 
Commission, and lawyers from law 
firms associated with the intentions 
and purpose of the supervision of 
mergers according to Thai 
competition law and the outcomes of 
the enforcement of trade competition 
law for the supervision of mergers 
used at present. 
4. Develop the study conclusions 
and suggestions for improving the 
supervision of mergers according to 




The findings from the study are 
divided into two parts. The first part 
relates to the standards used in the test 
for a substantial lessening of 
competition from mergers in foreign 
countries. The second part relates to 
the test for a substantial lessening of 
competition and developing a 
guideline for considering mergers 
likely to substantially lessen 
competition according to the current 
enforcement of Thai competition law. 
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The Substantial Lessening of 
Competition Test According to the 
Competition Law of Different 
Countries 
 
The analysis and comparison of 
tests for substantial lessening of 
competition due to mergers according 
to competition law and their 
associated guidelines in the United 
States of America, European Union, 
Japan, and Singapore, has shown that 
standards and factors used to consider 
which mergers may result in a 
substantial lessening of competition in 
each country all have the same 
direction. Competition law regulatory 
authorities in each country have 
similarities in the guidelines used for 
considering whether or not to allow 
business operators to merge their 
business; business operators in those 
countries easily understand the 
processes and procedures of mergers 
according to competition law (Silva et 
al., 2011). 
In each country, the regulatory 
authorities’ processes for considering 
mergers start from consideration of 
the size of the firms to be merged, 
assessing the firms in the context of 
the assets or sales volume of each 
business operator. This excludes 
small businesses, an element of the 
process known as a safe harbor (Yang 
& Pickford, 2010). For example, 
according to the United States 
antitrust law, a business operator must 
seek permission for a merger only 
when the merger will enable the 
business operators to have combined 
assets worth more than US$ 94 
million (Mucchetti et al., 2020). 
Following Japanese antimonopoly 
law, a business operator must seek 
permission for a merger when the 
business operators as merging 
companies had a combined turnover 
exceeding 20 billion yen in the 
previous year. Simultaneously, each 
business operator of the merged 
company must have turnover in the 
previous year exceeding 5 billion yen 
(Matsuthita & Davis, 1990) 
In the case of business operators 
meeting the inclusion criteria, the 
regulatory authorities in each country 
utilize these criteria and factors as the 
standard against which potential 
mergers may be examined, 
determining which mergers may 
result in a substantial lessening of 
competition, which itself can be 
divided into six major factors, namely 
1) changes in market structure, 2) anti-
competitive effects, 3) purchasing 
power in the market, 4) market entry, 
5) efficiency gains from mergers, 6) 
reasons related to the necessity of 
business operators. Each country's 
regulatory authorities consider all six 
factors to decide whether a merger 
should be permitted to take place or 
not (Lasok & Holmes, 2012). 
Concerning changes in market 
structure, the regulatory authorities 
shall, in the first instance, consider 
how much a merger can change the 
market structure. It can be said that 
this is the most significant factor in 
assessing which mergers may result in 
a substantial lessening of competition 
(OECD, 2009). Namely, how much 
mergers can change a monopolistic 
competition market to become an 
oligopoly market or from an oligopoly 
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market to become a monopoly market. 
In this regard, each country's 
regulatory authorities employ an 
economic index to assess the market 
concentration as a criterion for 
consideration. Some countries assess 
the market concentration by looking 
at the concentration ratio (CR), which 
is computed by summing the three to 
four largest firms' market shares. A 
perfect competition market shall have 
a concentration ratio close to 0%, 
while a concentration ratio of a 
monopoly market is 100% (Robin, 
2007). For instance, according to 
Singapore competition law, a merger 
enabling a concentration ratio of the 
top three largest firms to be 70% or 
more is considered as a significant 
change to the market structure which 
tends to lessen competition 
substantially (Lim & Bull, 2015). 
Another model for assessing 
market concentration is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), 
which calculates the sum of the 
squares of every firm in the relevant 
market. HHI was adopted to assess 
competition levels in the market 
during the 1980s by the United States 
Department of Justice. A market with 
an HHI of less than 1,000 is regarded 
as highly competitive, while a market 
with HHI values between 1,000 and 
1,800 is considered moderately 
competitive, and a market with HHI 
above 1,800 is regarded as 
uncompetitive (Hovenkamp, 2020). 
Therefore, from that time, the United 
States Department of Justice has 
carefully observed mergers of 
businesses in a market with HHI 
above 1,000 and have opposed 
mergers resulting in HHI above 1,800 
(Golden, 1993). The HHI criteria have 
improved continuously until today, 
where a merger of markets with HHI 
values above 1,500 shall be closely 
monitored and there is opposition to 
mergers in which HHI values are 
higher than 2,500 (Roberts, 2014). 
The United States' method to assess 
the impact on the market structure is 
so popular that competition regulatory 
authorities of the European Union and 
Japan have applied it to their 
competition laws (DG Competition, 
2004). Characteristics of changes in 
the market structure are concluded 
and shown in Table 1. 
 






market Oligopoly Monopoly 
Number of businesses by 
industry 
High High Few Only one 
Barriers to market entry No No Moderate High 
Price control by businesses No Some Feasible Feasible 
oncentration ratio (CR) Near to 0 Low High 100 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) 





Note. Adapted from “Foundations of microeconomics” by Robin, B., 2007. 
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Possible anti-competitive 
effects of mergers - Regulatory 
authorities should assess possible 
anti-competitive effects due to 
mergers. Possible anti-competitive 
effects can be divided into two types, 
as mentioned earlier; these are 
unilateral effects and coordinated 
effects. 1) Unilateral effects refer to 
situations in which a merger causes 
business operators to set the price of 
products or services to be higher 
without cooperating with other 
business operators. Unilateral effects 
can occur when a merger results in 
decision-making regarding the 
production of products or services to 
be under the control of any business 
operator, or can occur when buyers in 
the market lose their power of 
negotiation because the merger 
produces a smaller purchasing choice, 
such that product or service prices 
cannot be negotiated as usual. Though 
the merger does not give the business 
operator a dominant position, the 
merger may promote the business 
operator's market power enough to 
cause the outlined effects. 2)  The 
coordinated effects, which arise when 
a merger eliminates competition 
between the merging firms, or the 
merger enables business operators to 
easily lessen competition in a 
particular market. Cooperation among 
business operators can occur on the 
basis of explicit cooperation or 
implicit cooperation. Finally, it affects 
those business operators to mutually 
raise prices, lessen production volume 
or reduce the variety or quality of the 
products and services in the market, 
similarly to unilateral effects. In cases 
where the consideration of mergers by 
regulatory authorities results in the 
determination of mergers which may 
harm competition regardless of 
unilateral effects or coordinated 
effects, those mergers shall be 
rejected (Shiau & Chen, 2011). 
Factors related to the power of 
buyers in the market - In general, the 
competitive pressure of business 
operators can come not only from 
competitors in the product or service 
market but also from the power of 
buyers in the market, since buyers 
regularly have the power to change 
the business operators with whom 
they conduct transactions, especially 
regarding large buyers in a particular 
product or service market. 
Consequently, a merger that results in 
buyers losing their buying choices or 
lessening the negotiating power of 
buyers shall be taken as a factor into 
consideration. The regulatory 
authorities shall consider the strength 
of the power of buyers in the market. 
If buyer power is high, it shall drive 
business operators not to have 
behaviors resulting in anti-
competitive effects, since buyers have 
enough negotiation power to change 
to buy products or services from other 
business operators. Therefore, if 
buyers in the market have high 
negotiation power, the chance that 
mergers shall cause anti-competitive 
effects shall be reduced even though 
business operators will have a high 
market share or the market will have a 
high concentration ratio after the 
merger. Consequently, mergers may 
be permitted, even though they may 
result in a  high  market  concentration 
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(Goyder, 2003). 
Factors related to market entry 
refer to the chances that other business 
operators shall enter into a merged 
product or service market. Usually, a 
market that business operators can 
enter into easily is a market that does 
not require a high investment, and 
there is no law being a barrier for 
market entry. Consequently, that 
merger shall temporarily enable 
business operators to increase market 
power because new business 
operators shall oppose any attempt to 
set prices higher than competitive 
prices by merging business. 
Therefore, mergers in a market that 
new business operators can enter into 
easily do not tend to harm competition 
in the market (Inoue, 2007). However, 
the regulatory authorities regard 
adequate market entry enableing 
mergers not to harm competition in 
the market as meeting all of three 
conditions: 1) time condition; other 
business operators must be able to 
enter into the market fast enough to 
allow consumers not to have an 
impact from any mergers. Regarding 
market entry that can prevent mergers 
from giving a negative impact, the 
regulatory authorities of the European 
Union and Japan specify that market 
entry must occur within two years 
from the date the merger takes place. 
2) The possibility condition states that 
business operators entering the market 
shall operate their businesses without 
loss. 3) Sufficiency condition refers to 
the size of a new business operator 
entering into the market, stating that it 
should be big enough to prevent an 
impact that opposes the competition 
effects caused by mergers 
(Matsushita, 2004). 
Factors related to efficiency 
gains from mergers - Considering 
the probable impacts caused by a 
merger, the regulatory authorities 
shall view whether the mergers shall 
give higher efficiency in the economic 
system or not. Mergers shall be 
efficient when they enable business 
operators to reduce production costs, 
meaning that they can produce a 
higher quantity of products or 
services, as well as a higher quality 
compared to when mergers do not 
take place. The regulatory authorities 
of each country determine the 
characteristics of efficiency gains 
from mergers as follows: 1) mergers 
should reduce the costs of production 
until the prices of products or services 
can be lowered within the right time, 
allowing consumers to have 
significant benefits; 2) mergers should 
be unlikely to have an impact on 
competition in the market.; 3) 
improved efficiency must actually 
occur, not from estimation. Business 
operators must prove to the regulatory 
authorities that improved efficiency 
may occur from the merger 
(Renckens, 2007). 
For example, regarding the 
decision of the Office of Fair Trading 
of the U.K. (OFT) for the merger 
between Global Radio UK Limited 
and GCap Media plc (Global/GCap), 
the radio operators, presented to the 
OFT that this merger would be very 
effective. In other words, the merger 
would allow the two operators to 
become co-owners of radio stations, 
which would incentivize operators to 
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package broadcasting for every radio 
station they own at a lower price, 
which corresponded to the actual 
performance observed, and which 
could only be achieved through such a 
merger. Therefore, the direct benefit 
to consumers from this merger, 
coupled with the divestiture of some 
radio stations currently owned by the 
business operator, allows the OFT to 
permit the operators of this merger 
even though the merger gives the 
operator a relatively high market 
share (Kokkoris & Shelanski, 2014). 
Factors related to the necessity 
of business operators - In addition to 
those five factors, each country's 
regulatory authorities have an 
exception for mergers that have a high 
probably to result in a very high 
market concentration ratio or a 
negative impact. If it appears that 
business operators are unable to 
operate their businesses further due to 
operation failure, causing them to exit 
the market if the merger does not take 
place, the regulatory authorities shall 
consider such a case, ultimately 
permitting the business operators to 
merge their businesses. Reasons 
related to the necessity of business 
operators must consist of a critical 
condition, for example, where one of 
the business operators will need to 
exit the market very soon due to 
financial problems, and the merger is 
the method used to solve their 
problems; this is less likely to affect 
competition in the market (Wakui, 
2018). 
 
The Substantial Lessening of 
Competition Test According to 
Competition Law of Thailand 
 
The assessment of the impacts 
from mergers through the concept of 
testing the likelihood of a substantial 
lessening of competition from 
mergers under competition law in 
foreign countries is full of 
thoroughness and complexity as at 
least six factors are employed in the 
consideration when assessing whether 
a merger is likely to lessen 
competition substantially or not. 
However, the assessment of the 
impacts from mergers within the 
concept of testing for a substantial 
lessening of competition from 
mergers under Thailand’s Trade 
Competition Act B.E. 2560 (2017) is 
simple, without intricate details, but 
with high tangibility, making the 
standard according to Thailand’s 
Trade Competition Act certain and 
explicit when enforced by the Trade 
Competition Commission (the 
Commission). 
The test for substantial lessening 
of competition from mergers under 
the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 
(2017) follows the Announcement of 
the Trade Competition Commission 
on Rules, Procedures and Conditions 
for Notification of Business Merging 
Result B.E. 2561, which specifies that 
the merged company must employ the 
combined turnover of the merging 
companies as an essential factor for 
making consideration. Specifically, if 
the combined turnover of the merging 
companies is one billion baht or more 
and does not result in a monopoly or 
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having a dominant position, the 
merger shall be regarded as a merger 
leading to a substantial lessening of 
competition. 
According to Thai competition 
law, business operators undertaking a 
merger that is likely to substantially 
lessen competition should report 
merger results to the Commission 
within seven days from the date the 
merger takes place. Providing that 
they do this, they are not required to 
wait for permission from the 
Commission before merging their 
businesses. This process is referred to 
as a post-merger control mechanism, 
rather than market structure 
supervision, which occurs in advance 
of mergers, and is described in the 
supervising model of mergers under 
other countries' competition laws. 
However, the Commission has 
adopted the six factors used in 
assessing the impact of mergers under 
the competition laws of foreign 
countries as a basis for assessing the 
impact of mergers under the Trade 
Competition Act B.E. 2560. All of 
these factors appear in the 
Announcements of the Trade 
Competition Commission in the 
Criteria, Procedures and Conditions in 
Requesting for the Permission and the 
Permission for Business Merging B.E. 
2561, which apply to mergers that 
may cause a monopoly or result in a 
dominant position in the market under 
Section 51 paragraph two of the 
Competition Act B.E. 2560. 
Therefore, the Commission has 
authority to take all six factors into 
account regarding their consideration 
of whether or not to allow business 
operators to merge their businesses 
when the merger may create a 
monopoly or dominant position in the 
market. 
Nevertheless, in assessing the 
impact of mergers based on these 
factors, the Commission has not set 
clear criteria or details for considering 
each factor. Therefore, the 
determination of the factors for 
assessing the impact of the merger is 
based on an interpretation of the 
Commission without any framework 
or objective guidelines, making the 
consideration for granting or not 
allowing business operators to 
conduct a merger exclusively up to the 
discretion of the Commission. 
An example of applying the six 
factors to assess the impact of mergers 
under the concept of a substantial 
lessening of competition according to 
the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 
is the decision of the Commission on 
the merger between C.P. Retail 
Development Co., Ltd. and Tesco 
Stores (Thailand) Co., Ltd. 
Considering market 
concentration under this decision, 
the Commission followed the 
standard under the competition law of 
different countries by taking the HHI 
index as a tool for consideration. The 
Commission ruled that the two 
operators’ overlapping market is a 
small retail market with an HHI of 
5,553.19 before the merger. It showed 
that the market was already highly 
concentrated, and the merger would 
increase the HHI by 1,390.90 to 
6,944.09. 
In considering possible anti-
competitive effects of the merger, 
The Substantial Lessening of Competition Test for Mergers Under Competition Law:  
Lessons from The United States, European Union, Japan, And Singapore 
   305 
the Commission looked at both 
unilateral and coordinated effects. 
The Commission assessed the 
unilateral effects by estimating the 
likelihood that the merging companies 
would abuse their market power, 
reducing or limiting competition in 
such a way that would adversely 
affect their trading partners or 
competitors. The Commission found 
that the bargaining power of the 
merging companies for purchasing 
goods and raw materials would 
substantially increase. Thus the 
merging companies are likely to use 
their increased market power and 
bargaining power to put pressure on 
manufacturers with less bargaining 
power. The merger will also allow the 
merging companies to benefit from 
economies of scale and gain a greater 
competitive advantage over their 
competitors. 
The Commission assessed the 
potential coordinated effects by 
considering whether the merging 
companies were likely to collaborate 
with other business operators to 
reduce or limit competition or not. 
Based on the merging companies' 
market share, the Commission argued 
that the merging companies would 
have a market share of up to 83.05%, 
which is very different from other 
business operators, and therefore it 
would not have incentives to 
cooperate with other smaller business 
operators. The Commission thereby 
concluded that it is unlikely that the 
merging companies would form an 
anti-competitive agreement with other 
business operators. 
In  considering  buyer  powers, 
the Commission assessed buyers' 
purchasing options in the market as 
other countries' regulatory authorities 
do. It was found that the merger will 
leave fewer purchasing options to 
buyers, and thus may increase the 
power of the merging companies to 
control product prices. Nonetheless, 
the Commission argued that buyers 
still have the popular online shopping 
option. 
In considering market entry 
barriers, the Commission adopted 
the laws relating to business operation 
and the cost of doing business as a 
basis for consideration. The 
Commission then concluded that the 
market involved in this merger had a 
low barrier to entry as it was a low-
cost business, and there were no laws 
impeding the entry of new 
entrepreneurs. The Commission did 
not consider other critical criteria such 
as the possibility of new operators 
competing with the merged company, 
the time for new business operators to 
enter the market, or whether new 
business operators would be large 
enough to resist the potential impact 
of the merger. These criteria are 
essential in considering entry barriers 
under competition law in foreign 
countries. 
To determine the efficiency 
arising from mergers, the 
Commission took the market share 
and competitive advantage of the 
business operator as a measure. The 
Commission then indicated that the 
merger would reduce the market's 
overall performance, without showing 
any description of how the efficiency 
arising from the merger would enable 
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the merging companies to reduce their 
operating costs and increase or 
decrease the price and quality of their 
products or services. 
To consider the necessity of the 
operator, the Commission took the 
intent of the acquired company, which 
wanted to focus on marketing in the 
U.K. under the reorganization plan as 
a basis, in conjunction with the 
outcome of this merger that would 
generate revenue and benefit for 
Thailand as the merging companies 
would not be required to send the 
profits back to the head office abroad 
like before. The Commission 
thereupon concluded that the merger 
was necessary and beneficial to 
promote the business without 
considering other essential conditions, 
such as whether this merger is the best 
solution to the operating problems 
regarding lessening its affects on the 
market. This consideration is totally 
different from the method of 
considering the necessity of business 
operators following strict competition 
laws in foreign countries. 
In conclusion, the overview of 
this merger's impact was likely to 
show that the merger could create a 
change in the market structure and 
potentially affect the competition in 
the market, including consumers. 
However, since there were no clear 
and binding criteria for the 
Commission to assess the merger's 
potential impacts, for example, there 
was no explicit specification for the 
increase of market concentration 
which should be allowed by the 
Commission when permitting a 
merger; in the end, the Commission 
thereupon can, at its discretion, allow 
the business operators to undertake 
such merger. 
In addition to the CP and Tesco 
merging decision, regarding other 
decisions on mergers published in 
March 2021, the Commission, at its 
discretion, allowed business operators 
to merge their businesses in all cases, 
even where these mergers were likely 
to have a significant impact on the 
market structure. These rulings show 
that, despite the introduction of a 
substantial lessening of competition 
approach to assessing the impact of 
mergers as part of merger supervision, 
it can be said that the implementation 
of the substantial lessening of 
competition concept under the Trade 
Competition Act B.E. 2560 is still 
primarily at the discretion of the 
Commission, due to the lack of 
binding criteria and a clear framework 
for considering the effects of mergers 




With regard to the comparison 
between the standards for testing 
mergers according to a substantial 
lessening of competition under the 
Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 and 
the standards under the competition 
laws of other countries as mentioned 
earlier, this has showed that the 
strength of the Thai standard is that it 
is highly tangible and explicit. While 
it is the only factor under 
consideration, the turnover of 
business operators can be used 
definitively to determine which 
mergers are likely to lessen 
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competition substantially, leading to 
easy settlement. Since the 
Commission does not have a chance 
to use their discretion to consider 
other factors, the indicators used in 
Thailand are easy to understand 
leading to stable enforcement. 
In addition, despite the merging 
companies' combined sales of one 
billion baht, being regarded as a 
merger that substantially lessens 
competition, the merging companies 
can still continue to merge 
independently without requesting 
permission from the Commission. 
The merging companies must only 
notify the outcome of such a merger to 
the Commission within seven days 
from the date of the merger. Based on 
interviews with a member of the 
drafting committee for the 
competition law of Thailand, the 
objective of this provision was to 
enhance convenience to business 
operators to operate their business 
smoothly and to give SME business 
operators exemption under this law, 
promoting the growth of SMEs in 
Thailand.  
From the view of business 
operators, it was found that the law 
was seen to be an adaptation of the 
international concept, but with 
standards set differently from the 
international standards, sometimes 
making them suffer from confusion 
and misunderstanding at the 
beginning. However, because of the 
simplicity of such a standard, they 
could easily understand and follow 
the standard by only considering the 
turnover of their business and that of 
the proposed merged company 
without considering other complex 
factors. This can reduce the 
administration burden and procedural 
involvement in mergers. 
According to the Commission's 
opinion as the regulatory authority 
according to the Trade Competition 
Act B.E. 2560, the tangible, certain, 
explicit, and easily-understood 
standards, makes law enforcement 
easy to carry out. Furthermore, the 
commission can speedily consider 
mergers as the only factor used in the 
consideration is the combined 
turnover of merging business 
operators, which can be easily 
assessed without complexity. This lies 
in contrast with the standards of 
foreign countries, whose regulatory 
authorities have a high burden in 
analyzing the impact from mergers, 
which can be called the heaviest 
burden for implementing the 
competition law in each country 
(Neils, Jenkins and Kavanagh, 2011). 
However, when taking into 
consideration the application of 
testing for the substantial lessening of 
competition approach under Section 
51 paragraph one and paragraph two 
of the Trade Competition Act B.E. 
2560, it was found that regarding the 
supervision of mergers according to 
the substantial lessening of 
competition concept in Thailand there 
are three significant problems as 
follows: 
First of all, the allowing of 
business operators to pursue a merger 
independently, without prior 
authorization from the Commission, 
even where the merger may 
substantially lessen competition. This 
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makes the Commission unable to 
supervise mergers which may 
negatively impact competition 
comprehensively. The experience of 
merger supervision in other countries 
has shown that even mergers which do 
not create a monopoly or dominant 
market position can still impact 
market competition significantly. This 
gap is the main reason the competition 
laws of different countries require 
mergers which are likely to result in a 
substantial lessening of competition to 
be given permission before they may 
undertake a merger. Also, the 
implementation of post-merger 
control mechanisms, in other words, 
requiring the merging companies to 
notify the outcome of the merger to 
the Commission so that the 
Commission can observe their 
behavior after the merger, has been 
proven to be difficult and costly by the 
regulatory authorities of other 
countries, whereby such measures 
have been deemed inappropriate to be 
used as a regulatory system for 
mergers. 
Secondly, since the standard is 
determined to be tangible, certain, 
explicit, and easily-understood, it 
does not have an appropriate level of 
detail to be used to assess whether a 
merger is likely to lessen competition 
substantially or not. Meanwhile, the 
Commission is not able to take other 
factors related to the assessment of the 
impact of the mergers into 
consideration. Consequently, there is 
a high chance to make a mistake in the 
impact assessment of mergers, as the 
estimated impact is unlikely to meet 
the actual impact. In reality, 
considering whether mergers are 
likely to lessen competition 
substantially or not should take into 
account all six of  the essential factors 
mentioned earlier in a comprehensive 
manner, in order to assess the impact 
caused by mergers correctly (Ross 
and Baziliauskas, 2000). 
It can be said that the standard of 
testing for a substantial lessening of 
competition from mergers according 
to the Trade Competition Act B.E. 
2560 is an exception of mergers or a 
safe harbor. It is not a standard in 
accordance with the concept of a 
substantial lessening of competition 
shown in the competition law of other 
countries. The lawmakers' opinion 
that the growth of SMEs should be 
promoted is agreed. However, in 
formulating the method for promoting 
those entrepreneurs, it was necessary 
to take into account the objective of 
the law that aims to prevent mergers 
that could adversely affect market 
competition. It appears that the 
current approach to promoting SMEs 
might render the Commission unable 
to comprehensively supervise 
mergers that may have such an 
impact, which contradicts the 
objective of the substantial lessening 
of competition concept to assist 
regulatory authorities in 
comprehensively  supervising 
mergers. In conclusion, considering 
only the turnover of business 
operators without other factors, 
especially changes in market structure 
caused by mergers, seems to be a 
guideline leading to failure in 
preventing the market structure from 
being affected by mergers. 
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Lastly, the current application of 
a substantial lessening of competition 
approach to assessing the impact of 
mergers without establishing clear 
and elaborate criteria for considering 
all factors, causes uncertainty and is 
an improper adaptation as its 
implementation still relies heavily on 
the Commission's discretion. The 
decision on the merger between CP 
and Tesco and other subsequent 
decisions offer empirical evidence 
that the adoption of the concept is not 
yet sufficient to prevent mergers that 
may negatively impact market 
competition. Due to the fact that these 
mergers will substantially affect the 
market, the Commission retained the 
independent power to exercise 
discretion in assessing the impact of 
mergers, but has allowed operators to 
conduct the mergers in any event. 
Compared to competition law in 
foreign countries, the standard of 
testing for a substantial lessening of 
competition from mergers in the 
United States of America, European 
Union, Japan and Singapore is full of 
details as concluded in Table 2. 
Considering the turnover of merging 
companies is merely a starting point 
for merger supervision. In case the 
combined turnover of those business 
operators is higher than what is 
prescribed in the law of each country, 
the merging businesses must seek 
permission for a merger from the 
regulatory authorities. The regulatory 
authorities must consider various 
factors in detail by taking into account 
the change of market concentration, 
the unilateral and coordinated effects, 
buyers power, market entry barriers, 
the efficiencies arising from the 
merger, and the necessity of the 
business operators. There are also 
thorough criteria for considering each 
factor,    leading   to   a    correct   and  
 
Table 2 Comparison table of factors used in the assessment of merger impacts 











































Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Buyers power Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Market entry Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Efficiencies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Failing firm 
defense 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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accurate assessment of the impact of 
mergers consistent with the intention 
to protect market structure from being 
affected by mergers. Meanwhile, 
competition law can be used to control 
the use of power in considering 
mergers by each country's regulatory 





It can be said that the 
international standards for testing for 
a substantial lessening of competition 
from mergers that have been widely 
introduced into the competition law of 
various countries, particularly the 
United States of America, European 
Union, Japan, and Singapore, is most 
often provided with detailed and 
complex guidelines for the 
consideration. Specifically, merger 
supervision starts from consideration 
against any safe harbor criteria. 
Afterward, the regulatory authorities 
consider other factors accordingly, for 
example market structure, possible 
anti-competitive effects, buyers 
power, barriers to market entry, and 
the efficiency gains from mergers, 
including the necessity for potential 
mergers of business operators, in 
order to correctly assess which 
mergers may result in a substantial 
lessening of competition. 
In contrast, the standard of 
testing for a substantial lessening of 
competition from mergers according 
to the Trade Competition Act B.E. 
2560 is characterized as exclusion of 
mergers from legal implemention (i.e. 
safe harbor). The Commission makes 
consideration of mergers only from 
the turnover of the business operators. 
If the combined turnover of the 
merging companies is one billion baht 
or more, it shall be regarded as a 
merger resulting in a substantial 
lessening of competition. Though the 
criteria are relatively simple, this 
probably leads to inaccurate 
assessment of the impact caused by 
the mergers which does not comply 
with reality. It also means that the 
supervision of mergers may not meet 
the actual objectives of the law, i.e. to 
prevent mergers that would be a 
potential threat to the market 
competition, and to protect 
competition in the market, also 
preserving economic efficiency 
(Hovenkamp, 2017). This leads to 
failure in enforcing Thailand’s 
competition law as in the past. 
Therefore, in order to encourage 
the supervision of mergers under the 
Trade Competition Act B.E. 2560 
through the concept of testing for a 
substantial lessening of competition 
from mergers to meet the actual 
objectives of the law, amendments 
should be made as follows: 
To begin with, the supervision of 
mergers should be improved by 
providing opportunities for the 
Commission to grant or not grant 
permission for mergers only after 
thorough assessment of numerous 
factors and accurate determination of 
whether they may result in a 
substantial lessening of competition. 
Consequently, the Commission will 
be able to comprehensively prevent 
mergers that may harm competition in 
the market. 
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Next, the Commission should set 
the factors used in the impact 
assessment of mergers under Section 
51 paragraph two to be used in 
assessing the impact of mergers under 
Section 51 paragraph one as well, 
enabling the Commission to correctly 
consider whether any merger could 
lead to a substantial lessening of 
competition or not. The addition of 
factors in assessing the impact of 
mergers under Section 51 paragraph 
one will not create additional burdens 
on small business operators or SMEs, 
as the Commission will still be 
required to consider the entrepreneurs' 
turnover before looking at additional 
factors. Therefore, the mergers of 
small business operators or SMEs 
with a combined turnover of less than 
one billion baht will still be exempt 
from any new law. Therefore, the 
growth of small business operators or 
SMEs will remain protected as it is 
now. At the same time, the 
Commission will be allowed to 
genuinely prevent mergers that may 
adversely affect competition, 
following the purpose of the law. 
Finally, the Commission should 
set clear and detailed criteria for 
determining the factors used in 
assessing the impact of mergers and 
will be in accordance with the 
international standards that appear in 
the competition laws of different 
countries in the regulation of mergers. 
Consequently, the discretion of the 
Commission will be appropriately 
controlled. Furthermore, the 
consideration of mergers by the 
Commission will be more transparent 
and more precise. 
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